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Abstract            
The literature suggests that more than 60% of young offenders in the USA and internationally are 
screened positive for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).  However, little scholarly 
attention is given to the role a defendant’s diagnosis of ADHD plays in court proceedings and decisions. 
The current exploratory qualitative study involves thematic content analysis focused on twelve court 
decisions dated from 2000-2011, from various jurisdictions, involving young defendants with ADHD. The 
findings suggest courts’ interpretation and treatment of the defendant’s ADHD diagnosis varies across 
cases, jurisdictions, and phases of the legal procedure. Evidence regarding the diagnosis was not 
sufficient, in itself, for the courts to make decisions that incorporate consideration of the disorder’s 
impact on the defendant’s functioning or treatment needs. When experts testify about the impact of 
ADHD on a case-relevant behavior or aspect of the defendant’s functioning, the court is more likely to 
take the disorder into consideration in its decision than when experts’ testimony simply states that the 
defendant is diagnosed with the disorder. Courts’ considerations for the defendant’s diagnosis of ADHD 
were reflected mainly in decisions to adjudicate the defendant as a youth and in sentencing decisions.   
The findings suggest a need for greater collaboration and communication among professionals in the 
criminal justice and mental health systems, in order to better understand the role of ADHD in 
relationship to the various phases of the adjudicative process and to better serve the needs and rights of 
young defendants with ADHD.  
Keywords: Young defendants; ADHD; expert testimony; adjudication; qualitative content analysis 
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Introduction 
During the last few decades the relationship between Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and delinquent or criminal behavior has been the focus 
of much clinical and empirical research (Eme, 2008; Gordon & Moore, 2005; 
Gudjonsson & Young, 2006; Young, Adamou, Bolea, Gudjonsson, Muller, Pitts, Thome, 
& Asherson, 2011). Data suggest that ADHD is a significant predictor of antisocial and 
delinquent behavior (Gordon & Moore, 2005; Young et al, 2011). Young et al. (2011) 
note that data from international studies, including the USA, suggest that more than 
60% of young offenders screen positive for ADHD.  Eme (2013) reports that between 16-
19% of incarcerated youth are diagnosed with ADHD.  However, little scholarly 
attention has been paid to the role a defendant’s diagnosis of ADHD plays in court 
proceedings and decisions (Gudjonsson & Young, 2006; Gordon & Moore, 2005).  
 The term “mental illness” in its legal context usually includes psychotic disorders 
or mental retardation (Packer, 2009).  But the criminal justice system pays little 
attention to other disorders, such as ADHD, which may also significantly impair the 
individual’s ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions, interfere with 
competent participation in the adjudication process, or require treatment options to be 
considered in the case’s outcome (Gudjonsson & Young, 2006).  Consequently, no clear 
doctrine, either legal or clinical, exists in the adjudication of young defendants with 
ADHD diagnosis. Gudjonsson & Young (2006) argue that even when clinicians diagnose 
symptomatology of ADHD in young defendants, they often lack expertise to understand 
the impact of these symptoms on the individual’s functionality, especially in the context 
of the criminal justice system.  Eme (2008) suggests that all personnel involved in the 
adjudication of youth, including judges, lawyers, and probation or parole officers, 
should be educated about ADHD and its impact on criminal behavior.  Given the 
acknowledged gap between the legal concept of mental illness and the clinical concept 
(as cited in the introduction to the DSM IV-TR, APA, 2000), it seems that in order to 
more effectively consider the impact of mental illness in general, and ADHD in 
particular,  on the actions of alleged or convicted offenders, an interface between clinical 
evidence-based data on mental illness (such as ADHD), and between legal parameters as 
defined by the various statutes that concern mental illness in the criminal justice 
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system, is required.           
 This paper focuses on content analysis of relevant court decisions in order to 
identify the nature and extent of such interface as it may be reflected in mental health 
expert testimony and courts’ decisions in cases that involve criminal adjudication of 
young defendants with a diagnosis of ADHD. It is not the purpose of this paper to 
critically examine the judicial soundness of the various court decisions that are analyzed 
here. Rather, the paper seeks to examine how the various courts are interpreting the 
impact of ADHD on the functioning of the defendants, and how much consideration is 
given to evidenced-based clinical information on ADHD when such interpretations are 
applied. Similarly, the content of court decisions is analyzed to examine how expert 
witnesses offer their testimony about ADHD and its impact on the defendant’s 
functioning in the adjudicative context. Analysis of court decisions that is guided by 
these questions can help to identify opportunities for collaboration between the legal 
and mental health systems in the courtrooms that adjudicate youth with ADHD.  
Review of ADHD as per the Diagnostic Statistical Manual  
Currently, ADHD is understood to be a developmental/neurological disorder, 
with childhood onset that involves symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity/impulsivity, 
or a combination of both. Thus, according to the Diagnostic Statistical Manual -4th 
Edition- Text Revised (DSM IV TR, APA, 2000), a person may be diagnosed with either 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Primarily Hyperactive/Impulsive Type 
(ADHD/PHI), if the main symptoms include over- activity and impulsive behavior, or 
with Attention deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Primarily Inattentive Type (ADHD/PI), if 
the main symptoms include deficits in attention processes.  Finally, a diagnosis of 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Combined Type is warranted if the symptoms 
include both hyperactive and impulsive behavior and deficits in attention processes.  
The 5th and newest version of the DSM (APA, 2013) has eliminated the typological 
diagnosis of ADHD, but continues to recognize that persons diagnosed with ADHD tend 
to display clusters of symptoms that can be classified as either predominantly 
inattentive presentation, hyperactive/impulsive presentation, or a combined 
presentation.  
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The neurobiological origin of ADHD seems to stem from under-development in 
certain regions of the brain, especially the frontal lobe (Mash & Wolfe, 2013).  Theories 
that explain the impact of ADHD on functioning differentiate between the categorical 
subtypes, or presentations of the disorder. The two most widely accepted models are 
Barkley’s Behavioral Inhibition Model (Barkley, 1997) and Klorman’s Selective 
Attention Model (Klorman, 1992).   
 
The Behavioral Inhibition Model of ADHD 
According to Barkley (1996; 1997), the mechanism of behavioral inhibition is 
responsible for self-regulation of behavior by delaying responses to environmental or 
internal stimuli and by modulating on-going responses in the presence of changing 
environmental conditions. In addition, behavioral inhibition contributes to short-term 
memory, by inhibiting responses to stimuli while the individual pauses to catalogue 
mental representation of events by temporal or consequential order. Persons with 
ADHD/PHI experience deficits in the behavioral inhibition mechanism, which leads to 
poor short-term memory and to poor self-regulation of affect and behavior.  In other 
words, the individual is unable to inhibit an impulsive response (either emotional or 
behavioral) to the stimulus, thus reacting to environmental or internal cues without the 
benefit of a mechanism that allows him or her to process the stimulus in its entirety or 
in its proper environmental context.    According to Barkley (1996; 1997), impulsivity 
occurs when the person reacts in response to poorly processed environmental or 
internal cues, whereas hyperactivity results from the person’s inability to self-regulate 
and modify a behavior pattern to match different environmental or social demands.  
Deficits in inhibition response mechanism interfere with sustained attention, a process 
that allows the individual to maintain a level of attention over time. 
The Selective Attention Model of ADHD                                                                                                                                                                                              
The Selective Attention Model, which attempts to explain the effect of ADHD, 
predominantly inattentive type, or presentation, on overall level of functioning, is based 
on the principle of cognitive event-related potentials (ERP) (Klorman, 1992).  The ability 
to respond to an event (stimulus) in a timely fashion is decreased by the presence of 
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competing stimuli, especially when such stimuli are complex.  Selective attention, a 
process that allows the individual to identify and focus on relevant information while 
preferentially ignoring irrelevant information, increases event-related potential (ERP) 
in the presence of irrelevant stimuli.  According to Klorman (1992), persons who are 
diagnosed with ADHD, Primarily Inattentive, exhibit deficits in their selective attention 
process, thus their ERP is slower and lower in magnitude.  Klorman’s model was 
supported by later research, which demonstrated that children who were diagnosed with 
ADHD Primarily Inattentive Type,  exhibited deficits in speed of cognitive processes and 
response speed,  especially in the visual and spatial domain (Barkley 1997; 1996; Mayes, 
Calhoun, Chase, Mink, & Stagg, 2009; Solanto, Gilbert, Raj, Zhu, Pope-Boyd, Stepak, & 
... Newcorn, J. H., 2007).  
Physiological Models of ADHD 
More recent research has identified other brain abnormalities that may be 
associated with ADHD. For example, Arnsten & Rubia (2012) report that in children 
with ADHD, neuroimaging studies indicate abnormalities in the inferior prefrontal 
cortex and the dorsolateral PFC, both of which are responsible for inhibiting irrelevant 
aspects of a stimulus, affording greater ability to attend to relevant information. They 
also indicate abnormalities in the connections between the PFC and brain regions that 
regulate attention and inhibitory control. On the other hand, some researchers (e.g., 
Sonuga-Barke, 2010) suggest that individuals with ADHD do not all display 
abnormalities in the same brain systems. Further research is needed in order to better 
understand the role brain differences play in the etiology and presentation of ADHD.  
The Link Between ADHD and Antisocial/Criminal Behavior 
ADHD correlates highly with antisocial and aggressive behavior. In discussing 
the prevalence of ADHD among juvenile delinquents, Kazdin (2000) estimated the rate 
to be between 19% and 46%. This prevalence rate is more than four times higher than in 
the non-delinquent population. More recently, Young at al. (2011) reported findings 
from international data indicating that up to two thirds of young offenders screen 
positive for ADHD. Similarly, Gordon & Moore, (2005) who studied incarcerated youth 
found that 20% of their sample were diagnosed with ADHD, a prevalence that is 
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significantly higher that the prevalence of the disorder in the general population.  
Similar findings were reported by Cohn, van Domburgh, Vermeiren, Geluk, & 
Doreleijers (2012) who studied characteristics of youth who were first time arrestees in 
the Netherlands. This study found that co-morbid externalizing disorders, such as 
ADHD in conjunction with Conduct Disorder (CD) or Oppositional Defiant Disorder 
(ODD), were significantly more common among youth offenders than among the 
general population, and that compared to undiagnosed or differently diagnosed youth, 
participants who exhibited these disorders were significantly more likely to be repeat 
offenders. 
Conducting a meta-analysis, Pratt, Cullen, Belvins, Daigle & Unnever (2002), 
examined the effect of ADHD on delinquency, both generally and by subtype of ADHD.  
Their results indicated that ADHD is a significant and stable predictor of delinquent and 
criminal behavior. Unnever, Cullen & Pratt (2003) investigated the link between ADHD 
and low self-control as a mediating factor leading to delinquent behavior, as well as the 
direct link between ADHD and delinquency. They found that children with ADHD 
reported higher levels of delinquent behavior compared to children without ADHD.  The 
results indicated that the effect of ADHD on delinquency was the greatest when 
accounting for the effect of low self-control as a mediating factor between ADHD and 
delinquency.           
 Several studies found specific symptoms of ADHD to be independent predictors 
of delinquent behavior in youth. For example, White, Moffitt, Caspi, & Bartusch (1994) 
found that impulsivity, a basic criterion for two of the subtypes of ADHD as per the DSM 
IV-TR, was highly correlated with delinquency both in terms of severity and persistence 
of the delinquent behavior.  Boys who displayed severe delinquent behavior also 
exhibited significantly higher rates of impulsivity than boys who displayed stable non-
delinquent patterns or mildly delinquent patterns of behavior.  Furthermore, 
impulsivity was found to contribute to an increase in delinquent behavior from age 10 to 
age 12-13.  Based on their results, White et al. (1994) conceptualized ADHD as a 
cognitive disorder that affects instrumental behavior. They distinguished between 
cognitive impulsivity and behavioral impulsivity. Cognitive impulsivity results from 
deficits in the frontal lobes and may be related to poor assessment of problems, which, 
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in turn, leads to poor choices of solutions.  Behavior impulsivity results from lack of 
balance between the Behavior Inhibition System (BIS), which responds to cues about 
punishers, and the Behavior Activation System (BAS), which responds to cues regarding 
rewards.  Impulsivity is probably linked to cognitive deficits in accurate identification of 
rewards and punishers and the consequential inability to modify behavior according to 
changes in environmental cues.  This view of ADHD was later supported by Barkley’s 
Behavior Inhibition Model (Barkley, 1997; 1996).      
 Other research focuses on the neurobiological etiology of disinhibition and 
impulsivity (see Neuhaus  & Beauchaine, 2013) and have highlighted the link between 
the presence of impulsive tendencies, environmental risk factors and a number of 
externalizing pathologies such as ADHD, and myriad delinquent and antisocial 
behaviors.           
 Abikoff & Klein (1992) also acknowledged the role of deficits in cognitive 
processes in predicting aggressive behavior.  They found that children with ADHD are 
more likely than children without ADHD to misinterpret social cues, and thus are more 
prone to react with aggression to ambiguous social situations.  Several studies have 
focused on investigating the relationship between delinquency and the impact that a 
diagnosis of ADHD has on functioning, especially in terms of low self-control, or poor 
self-regulation of behavior, affect and cognitive processes, all described by Barkley  
(1997; 1996) as the core feature of ADHD.  Pratt et al. (2002) have theorized that ADHD 
may be linked to delinquent behavior because the disorder serves as a “potential catalyst 
for the early onset of antisocial conduct” (p. 353).  Moreover, Unnever, Cullen & Pratt 
(2003) found that poor self-control, a common characteristic in youth with ADHD, is 
associated with delinquency.    They noted that delinquent persons with ADHD tend to 
be susceptible to arrests since, due to their condition they are “less judicious in how they 
commit offenses, thus making them more detectable” (Unnever, Cullen & Pratt, 2003, p. 
496). It is important to note that the same processes that affect poor decision-making in 
terms of how a person with ADHD commits an offense also govern and impair that 
person’s self-control that leads him to commit the offense in the first place.   Similarly, 
Schaeffer, Petras, Ialongo, Poduska, & Kellam, (2003) hypothesized that the link 
between attention and concentration problems and aggressive behavior found in their 
sample is associated with the transactional effect of ADHD on the child’s 
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communication patterns with his environment.        
 In his excellent review of studies that investigate causal factors in antisocial 
behavior, Rutter (2003) noted that early conduct problems as well as emotional 
callousness are significant risk factors in antisocial behavior.  He further noted that   
conduct problems (a)re associated with emotional and 
behavioral disregulation [sync], as reflected in impulsivity and 
hyperactivity, whereas callousness and unemotionality  [sync] 
appeared to operate through lack of behavioral inhibition to 
novel and dangerous activities, responses to cues to 
punishment, and reactivity to negative emotional stimuli.  
(p.372) 
In this analysis, Rutter, in fact, describes the classical behavioral, cognitive, and 
emotional functioning patterns of individuals with ADHD.  Understanding these 
patterns in context of the disorder and in the context of their effect on antisocial 
behavior underscores the role of ADHD in predicting, and contributing to, antisocial 
behavior.  More recent research (as cited in Frick, Ray, Thornton, & Kahn, 2013) 
suggests that children displaying high levels of callous and unemotional traits appear to 
display fearlessness, indifference to punishment, and “low responsiveness to cues of 
distress in others” (p. 27) which place them at risk for antisocial behavior because they 
fail to inhibit their behavior in response to cues of distress from others. 
Key Concepts: The Impact of ADHD on the Adjudication of Young Defendants 
Concern for the rights of minors who face criminal charges has become 
increasingly relevant since 1967, when In re Gault, the Supreme Court mandated due 
process for minors who were adjudicated in either juvenile court or in adult criminal 
court (NASW, 2010). While Gault was intended to protect minors by providing them 
with rights equivalent to those of adult defendants, i.e., notice of charges, assistance of 
counsel and the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, (Feld, 2000), it 
failed to consider whether youth were capable, developmentally, to exercise these rights 
(Buss, 2000).  Adjudicative competence involves the ability to understand the charges 
and their ramifications, the ability to understand the judiciary process and the 
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respective roles of the participants (judge, jury, prosecutor, defense attorney etc.) and 
the ability to make autonomous decisions in one’s own best interest, including the 
ability to assist counsel in the defense process (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000; Buss, 2000; 
Grisso, 2000).  Research suggests that young defendants in general and those with the 
disorder of ADHD in particular, experience special challenges that may compromise 
their ability to effectively participate in the judicial process (Grisso, 2000; Gudjonsson & 
Young, 2006).  Generally speaking, a defendant can raise his or her condition of ADHD 
in relation to any of the following three adjudicative processes: pre-trial, trial and 
sentencing.   
ADHD in Pre-Trial Procedures 
In the pre-trial phase, ADHD may interfere with the defendant’s ability to fully 
understand his or her Miranda rights and the ramifications of waiving these rights. 
Feld, 2000, notes that young defendants may be aware of their rights, and can even 
repeat them (which is a typical standard that courts use to test for knowingly waiving 
Miranda rights).  However, oftentimes they do not comprehend the meaning of these 
rights or the ramification of waiving them.  Considering Barkley’s Behavioral Inhibition 
Model of ADHD (1997, 1996), it is easy to understand how the presence of ADHD, with 
its associated impulsive behavior and faulty decision making processes, may 
compromise the  full comprehension of Miranda rights, and their implications.    
ADHD during Trial Procedures  
During trial, ADHD may play a factor in determining the defendant’s capacity at 
the time of the alleged crime, as well as the defendant’s competency to stand trial 
(Bonnie & Grisso, 2000). Capacity and competency issues in young defendants are often 
dictated by developmental process, which may be affected by both maturity and mental 
health factors, such as the presence of ADHD. Grisso & Schwartz (2000) noted that as 
more and more states adopted policies that permitted the adjudication of adolescents in 
adult criminal courts, the issue of youth defendant’s capacity became increasingly 
relevant.  However, there is no doctrine or stated policy to guide the courts in 
recognizing factors associated  with developmental disorders (such as ADHD) as 
affecting  either capacity to control behavior at the time of the alleged offense, or the 
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competence to stand trial (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000).   Barnum (2000) suggests that 
youth’s competency to stand trial may be affected by the presence of psychopathology as 
well as by deficits in attention and information processing.  More recently, Gudjonsson 
& Young (2006) , in addressing the impact of ADHD on the young defendant’s “ability  
to effectively participate in his trial due to his problems with sustained attention and  
poor behavioral control” (p. 215), have suggested that courts may need to adopt special 
considerations  in cases that involve a young defendant with ADHD. For example, 
granting regular breaks during the proceedings, and simplifying questions during 
testimony can help to ensure that defendants with ADHD fully understand the content 
and process of court proceedings (Gudjonsson & Young, 2006). These 
recommendations are particularly relevant in the context of Klorman’s Selective 
Attention Model of ADHD (1992).    
ADHD and Sentencing Considerations 
 During sentencing, consideration of defendant’s ADHD can serve as a mitigating 
circumstance, helping to determine eligibility for rehabilitative purposes. Traditionally, 
the focus in adjudicating juveniles was to encourage treatment and rehabilitation 
(NASW, 2010; Scott, 2000). However, since the law provides that children ages 13 and 
older, who commit certain crimes, may be prosecuted in adult courts, the rehabilitative 
needs of young defendants in general and those with mental health challenges, such as 
ADHD, in particular, may be compromised. Scott (2000) notes that as more and more 
children are tried in adult courts for an increasing number of offenses, the “best interest 
of the juvenile” doctrine gave way to the “social control” doctrine that advocates 
punitive, rather than rehabilitative, approaches.  Corriero (2006) suggests that when 
sentencing a child, even if conviction has taken place in an adult court, the government 
has an obligation to strike a balance between protecting the public from violence and 
between working towards reforming the youth’s behaviors.     
 A waiver to adult court, a legal procedure aimed at allowing adjudication of a 
youth as an adult, while occurring at the beginning of the prosecutorial process, bears 
direct impact on consideration of rehabilitation or alternative incarceration of a young 
defendant during sentencing, if convicted.  A judicial waiver empowers a judge to decide 
whether to try a youth in adult court (Corriero, 2006, p. 130). There are six criteria that 
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the court usually considers in making a waiver decision including: age and social 
background of the defendant, the nature of the alleged crime, the defendant’s previous 
criminal record, the defendant’s  level of intellectual and psychological functioning, the 
defendant’s response to past treatment, and the availability of programs to address the 
defendant’s rehabilitative needs. While there are no guidelines as to the relative weight 
the court must assign to each of these criteria (Corriero, 2006), the recognition that a 
defendant may have a disorder and requires treatment may influence the court’s 
decision of whether to try a youth with ADHD as an adult and may also play a role in 
considering the option of rehabilitative services during sentencing.   
The Current Study 
This exploratory qualitative study analyzes content of court decisions that involve 
adjudication of youth with ADHD, and aims to gain a better understanding of the role a 
defendant’s diagnosis of ADHD plays in court proceedings and decisions.  To avoid 
confusion, the current study does not use the term “young offenders”, which has a 
specific legal connotation (Corriero, 2006). Instead we refer to the youth in the court 
decisions as” young defendants”.  Further, this study does not aim to legally analyze, nor 
criticize, the courts’ decisions.  Rather, it seeks to understand the role that ADHD may 
play in the adjudication process as reflected in the courts’ decisions.  More specifically, 
the following analysis of courts’ decisions seeks to respond to the following questions:  
1. How do the various courts interpret the impact of ADHD on the functioning of 
young defendants during the various phases of the adjudicative process? 
2. How do expert witnesses offer their testimony about the condition of ADHD and 
its impact on functioning, in the adjudicative context? 
3. What consideration do the courts give to evidenced-based clinical information on 
ADHD in the adjudicative decision making process?   
Method 
The Cases 
This study explores and analyzes the content of 12 court decisions representing 
various jurisdictions across the United States (see table 1).  
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Table 1. Court Decisions Jurisdictions 
 
Jurisdiction    Number of Cases 
California     3 
Florida      1 
Illinois      2 
Minnesota     1 
Missouri     1 
New Jersey     1 
New Mexico     1 
Tennessee     1 
Wisconsin     1 
 
Consistent with research principles that suggest that “a qualitative study is aimed 
at an in-depth understanding of a few cases, rather than a general understanding of 
many cases” (Grinnell & Unrau, 2011, p. 57) and that “qualitative samples tend to be 
small” (Trotter, 2012, p. 399), we have chosen to limit the number of cases in this 
analysis in order to allow for a more comprehensive and rich understating of the 
relevant content.  The cases were chosen  using an availability and purposive sampling 
procedure, resulting from the following search terms in the Lexis Nexis data base (a 
computerized legal database), under the  federal and state cases category: Attention 
Deficit + juvenile + sentencing; ADHD + juvenile + sentencing; ADHD + child + 
sentencing; ADHD + minor + sentencing; ADHD + juvenile; ADHD + child + decided. 
Cases were included in the analysis if they met the following inclusion criteria:   
Defendant’s age at the time of the offense. Only cases in which the defendant was 
18 years or younger at the time of the offense were chosen.  It is understood that the law 
allows for adult prosecution of offenders under the age of 15 when the alleged crimes, if 
committed by adults, amount to a felony (18U.S.C.5038(f)).  However, we embrace  
Grisso & Schwartz (2000) perspective that,  in effect, the legal definition of juvenile 
delinquency leads courts to increasingly ignore developmental factors that may 
qualitatively differentiate between adults’ and youths’ capacity for the same offense 
(Grisso & Schwartz, 2000), or competency to participate  in the legal proceedings 
(Bonnie & Grisso, 2000).  Since this paper focuses on the role a developmental disorder, 
namely ADHD, plays in the legal system, the use of the legal definition of a juvenile 
delinquent is replaced with the broader definition of youth defendant. Here we mean a 
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person who is a defendant in criminal proceedings, and who, at the time of the alleged 
offense, has not yet achieved chronological and developmental maturity.  
A diagnosis of ADHD. Only cases in which the defendant was diagnosed with 
ADHD were analyzed here.  Several cases involving co-morbid disorders were also 
included in this analysis.  
Time-period.  The court decisions analyzed here are dated from 2000 through 
2011, to parallel the time frame during which the DSM IV- TR (APA, 2000) was used to 
define the diagnostic criteria of ADHD. Appendix 1. represents the distribution of cases 
along several dimensions.  
Data Analysis 
Data were analyzed manually, inductively and thematically, relying on the 
constant comparative method of thematic document analysis (see Grbich, 2007, for a 
comprehensive discussion of qualitative data research methods).  Each author read each 
court decision independently and conducted a first level coding of the data to identify 
units of meaning and group into contextual categories.  The authors then met to 
compare the categories and respective units of meaning they generated for each case. 
When there was a disagreement in coding, the authors reviewed the court decisions 
together to ensure accuracy of data.  The authors then used the constant comparative 
method during the second level coding of the data, which again was conducted 
independently. During this phase, the authors generated themes based on the categories 
that were identified during the first-level coding. The authors met several times to 
compare findings, especially in terms of category grouping within the generated themes 
and in terms of relevance of specific cases to the generated themes and categories.  
When instances of disagreement arose, the authors reviewed the court decision content 
again independently and met a subsequent time to discuss the specific area of 
disagreement.  Based on the units of meaning extracted during the first-level coding, 
there were 86 instances of grouping content from the court decisions into specific 
categories. Initially, and after each researcher analyzed the data separately, there were 
80 instances of agreement, representing an inter-rater reliability of 93%. At subsequent 
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meetings and upon further independent review of the data, most instances of 
disagreement were eliminated, save one, representing a 99% inter-rater reliability. 
Results 
First-Level Coding 
The following categories have been identified during the first level coding phase:  
Role of ADHD relative to the legal proceedings phase: (e.g., interferes with the 
defendant’s understanding Miranda; contributes to diminished culpability or capacity; 
referred to in sentencing consideration); substance of evidence regarding 
presence/impact of ADHD: (e.g., how do expert witnesses explain the ADHD condition 
in the defendant, and its impact on functioning? How is the diagnosis linked to the legal 
issues at hand, namely, capacity to understand legal procedures, differentiate between 
right and wrong, control behavior, need for treatment, etc.?); the court’s treatment of 
the claim regarding role of ADHD in the legal proceedings (e.g., allowed/excluded 
testimony; evidence of court’s understanding, or lack thereof, of the nature of ADHD’s 
impact on functioning; degree of consideration of defendant’s condition of ADHD in 
court’s decision).   
Second Level Coding 
The second-level coding yielded three themes: (a) The defendant’s/appellee’s 
perspective regarding the role of ADHD in the legal proceedings; (b) Testimony 
regarding ADHD; and (c) The Court’s perspective regarding the role ADHD in relation 
to the legal proceedings.  The following sections present findings within each theme.  
  The defendant’s/appellant perspective regarding role of ADHD in the legal 
proceedings.  Two of the 12 court decisions addressed the impact of ADHD on 
defendants’ understanding Miranda rights. In both cases (Illinois v. Morgan, 2002, and 
New Mexico v. Gutierrez, 2011,) the defendants appealed their convictions claiming that 
their confessions were illegally obtained because the presence of ADHD interfered with 
their ability to fully understand the Miranda warnings they were given.   
Several of the court decisions (Illinois v. Ramsey, 2010; In re AJF, 2007; Randy 
Lamar Schoenwetter v. State of Florida, 2010; Tennessee v. Guy,2008) raised ADHD in 
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relationship to diminished capacity, where the defendants appealed their respective 
convictions, claiming that their condition of ADHD  should have been taken into 
account when the court determined  culpability.  For example, in Illinois v. Ramsey, 
2010, the defendant, an 18-years-old boy who was sentenced to death after being 
convicted of two murder counts, claimed, through the testimony of a psychologist, that 
he met one of the criteria of the insanity defense because his condition of ADHD 
prevented him from conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law, thus 
diminishing his culpability.  
Two of the court decisions raised the issue of ADHD in relationship to the 
diagnosed defendant’s competency to stand trial (Schoenwetter v. State of Florida, 
2010; The People v. Bobby Martin Gonzales, 2010), claiming that the condition 
prevented them from fully understanding the legal procedures. More specifically, in The 
People v. Bobby Martin Gonzales, 2010, the defendant, a 16-years old boy who has been 
sentenced 15 years-life imprisonment after being convicted of a second degree murder 
charge, appealed his sentence on the basis that his ADHD prevented him from fully 
understanding the consequences of his guilty plea, which the court had later refused to 
allow him to withdraw.   
The majority of the court decisions focused on the role of ADHD diagnosis in the 
sentencing phase of the adjudicative process.   In some cases the defendant raised the 
question of the morality in sentencing a youth with a mental disorder (that is, ADHD) to 
death (Schoenwetter v. Florida, 2010; The People v. Thornton, 2007).  In most of the 
cases the defendants requested consideration of their need for treatment to be 
incorporated into sentencing decisions. For example, in Tennessee v. Keaton M. Guy, 
2008, the defendant requested an alternative to incarceration which would involve 
rehabilitative services for his ADHD. Some cases involved waiver procedures in which 
the defendants appealed court decisions to waive their cases to adult courts.  In these 
cases, trying the defendant as a juvenile would have afforded rehabilitation services to 
be incorporated into the sentencing (re D.D., 2003; re Patrick, L.M., 2003; State v. 
Morgan, 2001; United States v. A.F.F. 2001).   
Of note is one case (re Brian J., 2007) in which the defendant argued against 
continued rehabilitative services to address his ADHD. At age 14 Brian J. was 
incarcerated in a juvenile facility after molesting an 8 year old girl. He appealed “a two 
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year extension of his commitment” under the juvenile extended detention act (EDA). 
Under this act a ward’s civil commitment may be extended for up to two years if there is 
sufficient evidence that his mental disorder continues to render him a danger to society. 
The youth argued that there was insufficient evidence that his mental disorder caused 
him serious difficulty in controlling his dangerous behavior or that any risk of re-offense 
was a result of a mental disorder, and that, therefore, extending his commitment was 
unconstitutional because it was penal in nature, violated substantive due process, and 
resulted in cruel and unusual punishment. 
 Testimony regarding defendant’s condition of ADHD.  In most of the cases 
reviewed here, testimony about the young defendants’ ADHD was offered by mental 
health professionals, usually a psychologist or a social worker.  In some cases, however, 
testimony was offered by non-clinician witnesses. For example, in Illinois v. Ramsey, 
2010, as well as in The People v. Thornton, 2007, the court heard testimony from 
teachers who spoke about the respective defendants’ behavior and academic difficulties.  
In re Patrick, L.M., 2003, and in State v. Morgan, 2001, the court heard testimony from 
probation officers who spoke about the availability of rehabilitation services in adult vs. 
juvenile facilities. Of all the cases reviewed here, only one case (re Patrick, L.M., 2003) 
involved testimony that addressed the presence of ADHD in itself. All the other cases 
involved testimony that lumped ADHD with other co-morbid disorders such as 
Asperger’s’ Syndrome (e.g., Schoenwetter v. Florida, 2010), Conduct Disorder and 
Borderline Personality Disorder (e.g., Illinois v. Ramsey, 2010).  In some cases, expert 
testimony offered by mental health professionals focused on specific or isolated 
symptoms, not necessarily in the context of ADHD as a syndrome or a disorder.  For 
instance, in The People v. Thornton, 2007, expert testimony addressed neurological 
deficits in the defendant, which was linked to possible hyperactivity, but made no direct 
allusion to ADHD.  In re Brian J., 2007, the evidence emerging from the expert 
testimony, offered by a psychologist, highlighted impulsivity, as well as the differential 
ability to contextually control behavior, but not in the context of the specific diagnosis of 
ADHD.  
Several cases involved expert testimony that linked ADHD with the defendant’s 
functioning and highlighted the relevance of the disorder to the legal standard in 
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question. For example, in New Mexico v. Gutierrez, 2011, a clinical psychologist testified 
about the impact of ADHD on the young defendant’s ability to understand Miranda and 
stated that ADHD could cause a diminished ability to focus, which might have impacted 
the defendant at the time Miranda rights were read.  Similar testimony was offered by a 
psychiatrist in Illinois v. Morgan, 2002.  In Illinois v. Ramsey, 2010, a psychiatrist 
expert witness testified about the defendant’s symptoms, as well as well as the potential 
impact of mental status on his ability on his ability to conform to the law.  In re Brian J., 
2007, the expert witness opined that the defendant was not in control of his behavior 
due to the impact of his mental disorders, including ADHD.  Several cases involved 
expert testimony that addressed the link between the defendant’s condition of ADHD 
and the need to consider rehabilitative services during sentencing (e.g., United States v. 
A.F.F. 2001; re AJF, 2007; People v. Bobby Martin Gonzales, 2010). It is interesting to 
note that not all instances of expert testimony that addressed the link between the 
defendant’s condition of ADHD and the legal standard in question have favored the 
defendant’s position.  For example, in re AJF, 2007, the expert witness did testify that 
ADHD is associated with impulse control issues, but did not indicate that this accounted 
for the defendant’s ability, or lack thereof, to control his actions.  Similarly, in The 
People v. Bobby Martin Gonzales, 2010, the expert witness testified that impulsivity 
could have affected the defendant’s judgment in deciding to plead guilty, but conceded 
that there was no real evidence that this was definitely the case. Essentially, while the 
witness addressed how impulsivity can play a role in making poor decisions in 
individuals with ADHD, he could not definitively say that was the case with this 
defendant.  
 The Court’s perspective regarding the role of ADHD in relation to the legal 
proceedings. Analysis of the court decisions reveals several instances in which the court 
was convinced by the expert testimony in regards to the impact of ADHD on the youth 
defendant, although this did not necessarily mean that the court ruled in favor of the 
defendant.  In re Brian J., 2007, the Appellate court determines sufficient evidence of 
risk associated with mental disorder, based on expert status of the witnesses, the 
testimony’s focus on observed behaviors rather than on speculations and the link drawn 
between the youth’s risk behaviors and his diagnosis. Notably, in this case the appellant 
was trying to prove that his functioning was not impaired by ADHD/other mental 
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disorders and that his sentence should end. However, the appellate court was convinced 
that the youth’s mental disorders, including ADHD, continued to have an impact on his 
functioning (despite his opposite claim) and affirmed a two-year extension of his 
sentence.  In re AJF, 2007, and in Schoenwetter v. Florida, 2010, the appellate court was 
convinced by evidence that did not support an impulsive behavior on the part of the 
defendant at the time of the crime and that therefore ADHD did not reduce culpability.  
In State v. Morgan, 2001, the court was convinced by the probation officer’s testimony 
that treatment for ADHD was available in adult facilities and was equivalent to 
treatment available in juvenile facilities. Similarly in re Patrick, L.M., 2003, the court 
accepted testimony regarding the defendant’s diagnosis of ADHD and his need for 
treatment but also accepted testimony that the defendant would get better treatment 
(longer term, more supervision) in an adult facility.  In both these cases the court 
affirmed denial of waiver and allowed trying the youths as adults. 
In several cases the court was convinced by expert testimony that advocated for 
rehabilitative services for the young defendant as part of the sentencing consideration.  
In the United States v. A.F.F. 2001, the court was convinced by testimony from the 
mental health expert, who testified that the defendant is likely to benefit from 
rehabilitation and therapeutic interventions. Since such interventions are more likely to 
be available in the juvenile system than in the adult criminal system, the court denied 
State’s motion to waive, allowing the defendant to be tried and sentenced, if convicted, 
as a juvenile. In re D.D., 2003, the court accepted the psychologist’s testimony as “most 
credible”. The court ruled that waiver was inappropriate because it would deprive the 
defendant, if convicted, of the necessary rehabilitation services.  
The courts’ consideration of   expert’s testimony about the ADHD did not always 
result in the court’s understanding of the nature of the disorder and its impact on 
functioning.  This was usually related to deficits in expert testimony, as reflected in the 
court’s decisions. For example, in New Mexico v. Gutierrez, 2011, the court states that 
“notwithstanding Child's ADHD diagnosis, there is no evidence that he lacks sufficient 
intelligence to have understood his rights or the consequences of waiving them.” This 
implies an incomplete understanding of the impact of ADHD, despite the expert’s 
testimony. Here the court states that “as long as there is a sufficient level of intelligence, 
ADHD could not have interfered with his ability to understand Miranda.” There is no 
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evidence in the court decision that the court has been educated by the expert witness 
about deficits in executive functioning due to ADHD even in the presence of normal 
intelligence.  In Tennessee v. Guy, 2008, the Appellate court cited the defendant’s 
medication refusal as evidence for low rehabilitation potential and therefore agreed that 
trial court refusal to apply alternative sentencing was appropriate. There is no evidence 
in the court decision that the court has been educated by the expert witness about other, 
non-medication-based, treatment options for ADHD. Similarly, in re Patrick L.M., 
2003, the court agreed that the defendant needed treatment for ADHD, but seemed to 
focus only on the duration of treatment available in an adult facility vs. a juvenile 
facility. In its decision, the court did not seem to address best practices for treatment of 
ADHD, nor was there a mention of such evidence in the expert’s testimony. However, it 
is important to note that the current analysis is based on the text of the decisions, which 
is not as comprehensive as the cases’ transcripts. Thus, it is possible that these issues 
were reflected in the procedure itself, albeit not mentioned in the decisions.   
Unlike the cases described above, there were several instances in which the 
court’s decisions reflected an understanding of the nature of ADHD, especially in 
relation to treatment needs.  In United States v. A.F.F. 2001, the court recognized the 
need for more than medication in order to effectively treat ADHD. The court recognized 
that adequate treatment including therapeutic interventions was not available via the 
adult system and allowed the young defendant to be tried as a juvenile.  Similarly in re 
D.D., 2003, the court exhibited understanding of clinical considerations of ADHD. The 
court considered evidence such as the impact of mental conditions on the defendant’s 
rehabilitation potential, his response to prior treatment, and his support system in 
reaching a decision that allowed the defendant to be tried as a juvenile.  
Finally, in several cases, the court’s sentencing decision reflected the weight the 
court assigned to the defendant’s condition of ADHD in considering the public good vs. 
the benefit to the defendant. In re AJF (2007) the consideration regarding the public 
safety outweighed the consideration for individual rehabilitation needs.  The court 
weighed mitigating factors against the severity of the crimes (first degree murder, 
aggravated robbery, burglary, criminal sexual conduct and second degree assault, and 
kidnapping) and found that the severity of the crimes outweighed AJF's treatment needs 
or the likelihood of his success of rehabilitation. In State v. Morgan (2002) the court 
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considered availability of rehabilitation services in an adult facility and weighed the 
potential for the defendant’s treatment success in such a facility against the need to 
protect the public safety. The court concluded that the need to protect society was 
greater in this murder in the first degree case, especially in light of defendant’s potential 
for rehabilitation in the adult facility. The court noted that in spite of testimony about 
the defendant’s fragile emotional state, and despite the fact that he clearly required 
treatment, his psychological impairment was so great that his potential for 
rehabilitation within the facilities that were available to the juvenile system were 
unlikely.  Paradoxically, as this case demonstrates, severe psychological impairment in a 
juvenile offender can sometimes lead the court to assign less weight to the rehabilitative 
potential factor. 
On the other hand, in United States v. A.F.F. (2001), the consideration for 
individual rehabilitation needs ultimately outweighed the consideration for the public 
safety.  Despite the severity of the crime (murder of an infant), the court gave greater 
consideration to the defendant’s realistic chances of succeeding in rehabilitation.  In its 
decision, the court stated “there is a statutory presumption in favor of treating the 
offender as a juvenile” (in A.F.F., 2001).  Based on this presumption and in light of the 
juvenile’s psychological impairment, and despite the severity of the charges, the court 
determined that the youth should be tried as a juvenile, so that he would have access to 
rehabilitation programs available in the juvenile system. Similarly, in considering the 
defendant’s potential for rehabilitation in re DD (2003), the court decided to deny 
waiver so as to allow defendant, if convicted of charges of robbery, attempted murder 
and aggravated assault, access to necessary rehabilitation services.  The court 
determined that the potential for individual rehabilitation outweighed the consideration 
for the public safety.  In this decision of first impression, the court specifically focused 
on the need to provide treatment for defendants who were diagnosed with mental illness 
(ADHD in this case).   In denying the waiver motion, the court set a precedent that gave 
greater consideration to the defendant’s mental health needs than that of the public 
interest, even when the charges were of a very serious nature.  In other words, the 
Superior Court of New Jersey ruled that for youth offenders, presence of mental 
impairment (such as ADHD) should be considered as a mitigating circumstance in 
outcome, regardless of the severity of the offense. 
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Perhaps the most telling case in terms of the relative weight courts assign to the 
public good vs. the benefit to the defendant is that of Patrick L.M, 2003. The youth, who 
was diagnosed with ADHD, was charged with five counts of first-degree sexual assault 
(four of which as party to the crime) and one count of kidnapping as party to the crime, 
appealed the order of the circuit court in Milwaukee County to transfer him to an adult 
court.  The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed the waiver. In addressing the 
potential compromise of treatment available for the defendant in an adult facility, if 
convicted, the Court of Appeals noted that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion 
even though it acted in a manner that was contrary to the best interest of the juvenile.  
The appellate court concluded that the law did not require the court to assign more 
weight to factors that related to the best interest of the juvenile than factors that related 
to the best interest of the public, thus highlighting the lack of standardized method to 
determine the relative importance of the defendant’s benefit vs. the need to protect the 
public good.  
Discussion 
This paper describes an exploratory qualitative study utilizing thematic content 
analysis of court decisions that involve young defendants with ADHD. The findings offer 
insights on several processes that take place during adjudication:  The courts’ 
interpretation of the impact of ADHD on the defendant’s functioning during the various 
phases of the adjudicative process; the nature of expert testimony about the condition of 
ADHD and its impact on defendants’ functioning in the adjudicative context; and on the 
consideration that courts give to evidence-based clinical information on ADHD in the 
adjudicative decision-making process.   
Results indicate that testimony addressed the cognitive and behavioral impact of 
ADHD on the defendant’s functioning in terms of understanding the adjudicative 
process (i.e., Miranda, implications of a guilty plea), the defendant’s ability, or lack 
thereof, to appreciate the consequences of the crime or to control his behavior and 
conform to the law, and the defendant’s treatment needs in the context of sentencing 
decisions. The findings suggest court interpretation and treatment of a defendant’s 
ADHD diagnosis varies across cases, jurisdictions, and phases of the legal procedure, to 
the extent that these have been represented in the current analysis.  Much of this 
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variability is grounded in statutes that allow the courts considerable flexibility in 
deciding on the relevancy of the disorder, especially in waiver and sentencing decisions. 
Thus, the courts often rely on expert testimony regarding the presence of the disorder 
and its impact on the defendant’s functioning in order to arrive at a decision.   
In the cases analyzed here, the courts allowed testimony regarding ADHD in 
relationship to all adjudication phases, including the insanity defense.  Usually courts 
were convinced by testimony regarding ADHD in that they did not challenge the validity 
of the diagnosis, but in some cases the courts were not convinced the disorder had 
caused any impairment in the defendant’s functioning.  Generally speaking, evidence 
regarding the diagnosis was not sufficient, in itself, for the courts to make decisions that 
incorporate consideration of the disorder’s impact on the defendant’s functioning (as in 
the case of decisions about Miranda, competency or capacity) or future treatment needs 
(as in the case of sentencing decisions). The court’s consideration of ADHD in decision 
making seems to be associated with the nature of evidence provided in expert testimony. 
Consistent with Gudjonsson & Young (2006), analysis of testimony content in the court 
decisions discussed in this paper suggests that mental health professionals do not 
always accurately and properly explain the nature of ADHD, its etiology, and its impact 
on behavior or information processing (i.e., deficits in cognitive or behavioral 
inhibitions, or deficits in attention that may result in poor information processing). Nor 
do they seem always educated in regards to the legal standard at hand when testifying 
about the defendant’s condition of ADHD. This was apparent in cases where expert 
testimony focused on specific symptoms, not necessarily in the context of ADHD as a 
disorder, or in cases where expert testimony made no linkages between ADHD and the 
defendant’s functioning or the legal issue at hand.   
The current findings suggest that when experts testify about the impact of ADHD 
on a case-relevant behavior or aspect of the defendant’s functioning, the court is more 
likely to take the disorder into consideration in its decision than when experts’ 
testimony simply states that the defendant is diagnosed with the disorder without 
relating the diagnosis to a case-relevant aspect of functioning, or when the experts’ 
testimony lumps ADHD with other disorders.  Courts’ considerations for the defendant’s 
diagnosis of ADHD were reflected mainly in decisions to try the defendant as a youth 
and to allow for rehabilitative options to be factored into sentencing decisions. Courts 
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were less likely to factor the defendant’s diagnosis of ADHD into decisions about 
capacity and competency. Only one case, the People v. Ramsey, 2010, involved expert 
testimony that directly linked ADHD with the inability to control behavior and conform 
to the law. The appellate court overturned the conviction in this case, stating that the 
lower court should have used a broader definition that required the defendant to prove 
that he experienced "inability to conform" as a result of his mental disorder. Other cases 
that addressed capacity and competency did not result in courts’ decisions in favor of 
the defendant, possibly because expert testimony did not sufficiently highlight the 
impact of ADHD on the ability to appreciate the consequences of, or control antisocial 
behaviors, and to effectively participate in the adjudication process.  
The current findings support Eme’s (2008) recommendations that professionals 
in the criminal justice system, who are involved in the adjudication of youth, should be 
educated about ADHD and its impact on criminal behavior. Indeed, professionals from 
the legal field (attorneys, judges, legislators) who are involved in the adjudication of 
youthful offenders with ADHD, must seek significant input from experts in the fields of 
clinical and developmental psychology in order to understand the nature of ADHD and 
its impact on the defendant’s functioning during the various adjudicative stages, 
especially in relationship to the defendant’s ability to actively and meaningfully 
participate in the various  adjudicative processes.  However, the findings also suggest 
that mental health professionals who serve as expert witnesses in cases that involve 
young defendants with ADHD should be educated about ADHD’s impact on the 
defendant’s functioning in relationship to the various phases of the adjudicative process. 
Furthermore, mental health professionals who serve as expert witnesses should also be 
trained in the relevant legal standards in order to ensure that their testimony can be 
useful as courts make decisions about due process and sentencing of young defendants 
with ADHD.   
The strengths of this study lie in the analysis of cases from various jurisdictions, which 
offers a broad perspective.  Analysis of cases that address different phases of the 
adjudicative process offers support for findings from the literature on the impact of 
ADHD on various aspects of defendants’ functioning (e.g., Corriero, 2006; Feld, 2000; 
Gudjonsson & Young, 2006) .  
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This study features several limitations.  First, the findings are based on only a few 
cases that are available via public domain channels and that meet the inclusion criteria. 
Moreover, only cases that allowed testimony about ADHD were included, thus 
introducing a selection bias into the analyses. Finally, court decisions are limited in the 
information they contain in that they provide summary of testimony rather than actual 
testimony. In future studies, analysis of actual court transcripts may yield a more 
comprehensive data, especially if more cases are available for analysis. Moreover, future 
research should focus on analysis of a more exhaustive sample of cases, possibly 
utilizing a quantitative content analysis based on coding of themes and categories 
revealed in the present analysis.   
Despite these limitations, and given the scarce body of knowledge about this topic 
in the literature, the exploratory qualitative design employed here is empirically 
appropriate. The current findings underscore the need for collaboration between 
criminal justice professionals and mental health experts. Joint workshops or education 
days are crucial in order for the system to better serve the needs and rights of young 
defendants with ADHD.  
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Appendix 1. 
Court Decisions Characteristics 
Charge
* 
Murder Attemp
ted 
murder 
Unlawf
ul 
taking 
of a 
vehicle 
Reckle
ss 
vehicu
lar 
homic
ide 
Robbery Burgla
ry 
Home 
invasion 
Criminal 
sexual 
conduct 
Aggrava
ted 
criminal 
sexual 
assault 
Molestat
ion of a 
child 
Assault Kidnapp
ing 
 8 3 1 1 3 4 1 2 1 1 2 3 
Co-
morbid 
disord
ers** 
Fetal 
Alcohol 
Syndro
me 
Frontal 
Lobe 
Damag
e 
Asperg
er's 
Disord
er 
Low 
IQ 
Borderli
ne 
Personal
ity 
Disorde
r 
Condu
ct 
Disord
er 
Depressi
on 
Oppositi
onal 
Defiant 
Disorder 
Trauma Antisoci
al 
personal
ity 
disorder 
Pedoph
ilia 
Learnin
g 
disorder 
 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 4 1 1 1 1 
* Represents the number of individuals with these charges, not the total number of charges 
** Represents disorders as they are listed in the court decisions, not necessarily fitting with formal DSM terminology 
